The concept of mind is an elusive one. Attempts to understand mind as a separate substance, a repertoire of behavioural dispositions, and as states of the brain, remain unsatisfactory. In this dismal scene, the folk concept of belief promised understanding of the mind without stepping into any of these options. The folk concept of belief has been viewed as designating mental states with some formally identifiable content, namely, the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, the concept of belief displays the character of mind by characterizing its states. A series of problems plague the prospect of determining contents of mental states. Moreover, ascription of beliefs does not seem to furnish a genuine science of the mind if beliefs are viewed in psychological terms. A very different view of beliefs emerges once they are freed from their alleged psychological role. In the alternative framework, the folk concept sorts beliefs into different kinds to highlight the believer, the kind of person she is. Since the sorting is always in context depending on the agents and their histories, no partitioning of beliefs is possible in advance. In that sense, belief is a concept designed for social-normative function; it is not meant to designate some "genetic" property of the human mind. The non-psychological view explains why radical scepticism, a scepticism that disbelieves everything, is genuinely possible.