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Ascription of knowledge
pp. 117-131
Abstract
Why didn't modern science develop independently in India despite impressive achievements in linguistics, logic, and computational techniques? One aspect of this very complex socio-historical inquiry concerns the philosophical issue of which epistemological categories are prominently available in the intellectual culture of a tradition. After rejecting a number of options, the discussion focuses on the concept of knowledge advanced by Plato, which has been formulated in contemporary times as justified true belief (JTB). It seems this concept of knowledge never found prominence in Indian philosophy. A detailed examination of JTB suggests that it does not work as a psychological theory of the epistemic subject. However, the theory seems to be normatively significant in prescribing who may be ascribed knowledge in the face of large-scale scepticism. The theory may be viewed as a set of conditions that a knowledge-claim must satisfy in order to convince the sceptic of the validity of the claim. Theoretically, this concept will not be needed in a culture in which there is already settled agreement on what counts as knowledge in terms of texts that may not be questioned. It is likely that the authority of the Vedas in the Indian tradition foreclosed the possibility of inquiry that could have led to modern science.
Publication details
Published in:
Mukherji Nirmalangshu (2017) Reflections on human inquiry: science, philosophy, and common life. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 117-131
DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-5364-1_8
Full citation:
Mukherji Nirmalangshu (2017) Ascription of knowledge, In: Reflections on human inquiry, Dordrecht, Springer, 117–131.