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Alethic functionalism and our folk theory of truth
pp. 29-43
Abstract
According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the view’s main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes “true” as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
Publication details
Published in:
(2005) Synthese 145 (1).
Pages: 29-43
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-004-1771-2
Full citation:
Lynch M. P. (2005) „Alethic functionalism and our folk theory of truth“. Synthese 145 (1), 29–43.