Epistemic obligations are constraints on belief stemming from epistemic considerations alone. Booth (Synthese 187: 509–517, 2012) is one of the many philosophers who deny that there are epistemic obligations. Any obligation pertaining to belief is an all things considered obligation, according to him—a strictly generic, rather than specifically epistemic, requirement. Though Booth’s argument is valid, I will try to show that it is unsound. There are two central premises: (1) S is justified in believing that P iff S is blameless in believing that P; (2) S is blameless in believing that P iff S has not violated an all things considered duty in believing that P. Both premises are false. My argument against (1) depends on my own theory of epistemic obligations. My argument against (2) does not. This paper is part of a larger project—defending epistemic requirements in general against a series of objections and advancing a particular theory that solves various problems.