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The metaphysics of natural kinds
pp. 1397-1426
Abstract
This paper maps the landscape for a range of views concerning the metaphysics of natural kinds. I consider a range of increasingly ontologically committed views concerning natural kinds and the possible arguments for them. I then ask how these relate to natural kind essentialism, arguing that essentialism requires commitment to kinds as entities. I conclude by examining the homeostatic property cluster view of kinds in the light of the general understanding of kinds developed.
Publication details
Published in:
McFarland Andrew (2018) Causation in the metaphysics of science. Synthese 195 (4).
Pages: 1397-1426
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0833-y
Full citation:
Bird Alexander (2018) „The metaphysics of natural kinds“. Synthese 195 (4), 1397–1426.