Even though philosophical studies on language and mind in the early twentieth century assumed a very sophisticated character, there is a popular perception in some influential quarters of the cognitive sciences that developments in these sciences in the later part of the same century have overtaken much of the classical concerns of philosophy in the study of the human mind. With the history of physics in hand, it is shown in some detail that shifting to other largely second-order notions of philosophy like conceptual analysis, rational reconstruction, external criticism, etc. do not help in resurrecting philosophy as a fundamental form of human inquiry. However, the philosophical form of inquiry continues to play a foundational role even with the advent of scientific theory in that philosophy can remind the scientific enterprise persistently about the actual goals of science. Here the philosopher is armed with a ground-level conception, in fact a form of solidarity, with the understanding already reached in common life for people to lead their lives as rational agents. Using the resources of common life relentlessly to question the real significance of science, philosophy may play a crucial sceptical role in restraining the scope of science, including the cognitive sciences. Beginning with a discussion on Kant's cognitive project to dispel Humean scepticism, the chapter illustrates the sceptical project with a study of contemporary linguistic theory. The focus is on the concept of meaning.