Rule communalism is the view that the rule asymmetry claim is true: rule-following (e.g. language-use) is possible for communal individuals but impossible for solitary individuals. The most notable argument of this general type is Kripke's Wittgenstein's argument in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke's Wittgenstein's argument, however, is not a paradigmatic example of communalism because it does not attempt to show that genuine rule-following is possible in a community. Instead, Kripke's Wittgenstein is a full-blown rule nihilist; his view entails that there is no such thing as rule-following, even in communities. What he offers is an ersatz alternative to rule-following which purportedly useful in communities, but not in solitude. I examine the prospects for defending genuine rule communalism on the familiar grounds that interpersonal—but not intrapersonal—correction can make rule-following possible even in the face of nihilistic arguments. I conclude that such arguments are extremely unlikely to succeed.