In  Chapter 1 we discussed briefly Gewirth's project of extracting from rational egoistic deliberation an implicit commitment to the value of the subject's own freedom, where this commitment supposedly has to be expressed in a form that necessarily entails acceptance of the agent-neutral reason-giving status of freedom in all other subjects. We agreed with Williams that this approach differs from Kant's way of deriving adherence to the moral law from the nature of rational deliberation as such in being a purely normative argument that placed no particular weight on the metaphysical implications of the freedom that rational agents as such must attribute to themselves. But maybe this contrast was prematurely drawn. For in the passage of Section II of the Groundwork that leads up to his introduction of that version of the Categorical Imperative often called the "Formula of Humanity", Kant might be thought to have indicated a way of conducting a primarily normative immanent critique of TE that, unlike Gewith's argument, does not run aground on the problem of levering the T-Egoist out of an acknowledgement of purely agent-relative reasons. That, at least, is the way the passage has been interpreted by sympathetic commentators like Korsgaard and Wood.