Ryall argues, with much historical irony, that the philosophical implications of Copernicus' insight directly oppose Kant's transcendental philosophy and this because the Copernican world-view presupposes for its vindication the truth of transcendental realism, not idealism. The thesis, therefore, is not simply a negative one in its insistence that Kant misappropriated the Copernican name but it offers, also, a positive case for a realist ontology which sits better with the "the change in the way of thinking" adopted by Copernicus. The account additionally demonstrates how Kant strayed (with his transcendental idealism) so far from the 'secure path of a science" as to lapse into glaring absurdity, as with his Ptolemaic claim that the earth "persists in space" while the sun moves in relation to it (B277 = 278).