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The pragmatic theory of the a priori
pp. 147-167
Abstract
Lewis's pragmatic theory of the a priori is given a partial defense. Though the strictly logical function may be vulnerable to Quinean objections, there is an epistemological function of the a priori that is not. Lewis's use of Einstein on simultaneity has problems, but correcting for those errors does not affect the basic idea. Lewis's theory of the pragmatic a priori is then contrasted with the similar ideas in Arthur Pap, who Lewis influenced, as well as Michael Friedman and Hasok Chang.
Publication details
Published in:
Olen Peter, Sachs Carl (2017) Pragmatism in transition: contemporary perspectives on C.I. Lewis. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
Pages: 147-167
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-52863-2_7
Full citation:
Stump David J. (2017) „The pragmatic theory of the a priori“, In: P. Olen & C. Sachs (eds.), Pragmatism in transition, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 147–167.