As has been seen in the previous chapter (section 1.3), many of those who attempt to dethrone the critical tradition do so by rejecting the very idea of knowledge and of scientific knowledge based in method. Further attempts by sociologists of scientific knowledge, Foucault and Nietzsche along these lines are critically reviewed in Parts II to IV. In contrast, in this chapter and the next the task is more positive. They sketch some of the expectations we have concerning theories of knowledge and method, and how we might defend certain conceptions of these against attacks mounted upon them. This chapter outlines some of the issues that arise in epistemology in an attempt to spell out a satisfactory conception of knowledge, and its impact on various conceptions of scientific knowledge. As will be seen subsequently, some of the dethroners of our critical tradition have given up on the goal of knowledge and have either embraced scepticism about our ever knowing anything, or have fallen into an easy relativism.