It is obvious enough to those who read what philosophers writing in English have to say about problems of history that the main focus of interest and point of contention is the nature of historical explanation. And even within that general theme, interest is confined more narrowly to the question of whether or not explanations in history rest upon general laws or theories, "covering laws' in the increasingly used term of William Dray. On the one hand, we have the view, often associated with the names of Hempel and Popper, yet including among its supporters such writers as Brodbeck and Gardiner, and actually rooted in writings earlier than those of any of these, according to which explanation must always presuppose general laws for only these can warrant an inference from one particular state of affairs to another particular state of affairs. And on the other, we have writers such as Donagan, Dray, Gallie, and Scriven offering a variety of arguments to the opposite effect, and in particular, making much of the claim that historians do indeed explain or offer explanations which are complete and reasonable, yet make no use of general laws. Some may think that the debate has grown stale and tedious, and that essentially the same arguments—though occasionally with greater subtlety—are repeated time after time. And some may deem it a matter of regret that neither side seems able to reach the other, or if you like, that neither side seems amenable to persuasion.