The aim of this paper is to analyze ethical perspectivism as an attempt to recover the objectivity of reality and value, following Scheler and Ortega y Gasset. Perspectivism will be distinguished from both universalism and subjectivist relativism. The idea of perspective in the realm of ethics can be found in Scheler's notion of "good itself for me". As well as universal duties, other duties exist only for each life and person.The philosophy of value entails a return to ethical objetivism. We could speak about a cordial objectivity of natural law. However, there are substantial differences between ethics of values and the traditional theory of natural law, especially, through the overcoming of the idea of what is universally valid. Despite the differences between perspectivism and natural law tradition (especially, the refusal to derive moral law from human nature) the philosophy of perspective can be considered as a new version of the natural law theory, full of interest for both ethics and philosophy of law.