Qualia are the modes of experiencing the external objects or internal states from "the first person perspective". In the contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness the concept of qualia remains a problem for any cognitive methods reducing human experience to a set of different brain functions. Qualia are the last fortress of subjectivity eschewing purely "objective" scientific approach. The present paper draws some parallels between qualia and the concept of "dharmas" (units of experience) peculiar to the Buddhist Abhidharma schools. It shows that the problem of qualia formulated in the West makes sense only in those Abhidharma theories that distinguish between the first and the third person perspectives. The arguments of the Buddhist epistemologists Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are examined in order to explain the appropriation of experience as "mine" with no reference to a metaphysical Subject (ātman). Their concept of preverbal, preconceptual self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) is proposed as a possible solution of the problem, how to give an account of "what is it like" to cognize, to think, to desire, to will, etc.