The account of objectification offered in Chapter 5 raises a number of questions concerning the relationship between the analysis of interpretive moral wrongs and radical theorising. This chapter aims to show, via a range of examples (Martha Nussbaum's reformist attempt to analyse sexual objectification; Marx's analysis of commodification; and the ethics of genetic databases), that an ethic of self-interpretation, suited to tackle interpretive moral wrongs, must adopt a radical rather than a reformist theoretical approach. The chapter, and Part I of the book, closes by drawing together themes from the preceding four chapters, to arrive at an interim conclusion, concerning the normative grounds of an ethic of self-interpretation. Kant held that respecting the dignity of human persons requires us to respect above all their capacity for principled self-determining action. I argue that respect for ontological persons also crucially involves respecting their dignity, through respecting their capacity for undistorted self-interpretation, and self-knowledge. This points the way to a distinctive and enduring role for an ethical principle of respect for ontological persons.