The definition of scientific progress as increasing truthlikeness was elaborated and defended above in Chapters 5 and 7. Some opponents — who may feel that this defense at best is valid for the natural sciences — will deny its applicability to the human and social sciences. Generally speaking, there are two grounds on which such a denial might be supported. First, as the realm of cultural and social phenomena is ontologically different from nature, it has been argued that the basic categories of the realist semantics and epistemology (especially the correspondence-theoretical concept of truth) are not appropriate for it. Secondly, independently of the first argument, it has been claimed that the social sciences have a peculiar aim which is different from informative truth. Even though these two grounds raise interesting problems for an attempt to extend the basic ideas of scientific realism to the social sciences, it seems to me that they are mistaken. In this chapter, my reasons for thinking so are summarized. I shall start from problems of ontology and then proceed to epistemological and methodological issues.