The asseveration that metaphor is woven into the fabric of the creative enterprise - scientific epistemology included - is so well established that it virtually defies impugnment. There is, for instance, a corpus of literature attesting to its ratiocinative significance (Bruner, 1962; Sacks, 1979) and the significant role it plays in scientific, among other epistemologies (MacCormac, 1976, 1983). In fact, it has been suggested that the provenance of consciousness itself is rooted in metaphor (Jaynes, 1976, 1986) and that it is essentially a "mental principle" (Gordon, 1961). Nonetheless, none of these analyses has been sufficiently systematic in their expatiation on metaphor as underwriting such a cognitive process. This paper proffers such an analysis based upon a conflation of Frye's (1957) systematic treatment of symbols and metaphor and Jung's analytical Psychology (de Laszlo, 1958). Although these seem to be disparate domains there is a natural confluence of theories here which serves to adumbrate the intuitionistic side of scientific epistemology, that is to say, the creativity underlying scientific discovery.