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Necessity and contingency in Wittgenstein's thought

Antonia Soulez

pp. 176-184

Abstract

Is there a logic of empirical reality? No member of the Vienna Circle would have answered positively to such a question; and Wittgenstein, who of course was apart, less than the others. My point here is, in a way, to show the internal reasons of this impossiblitiy especially in Wittgenstein's thought rather than just accept the commonplace that logical empiricists in a stricter or looser sense defined themselves as opposed to any kind of mysterious link between logic and reality. One can legitimately doubt that these reasons are the same as the ones other Viennese philosophers would have advocated. Yet has the question even a sense in the context of his philosophy? Clearly, Wittgenstein' s rather odd "empiricism" leads one to question the respective status of necessity and possibility before answering the question whether contingency proper can fit into a logical framework or not.

Publication details

Published in:

Haller Rudolf, Brandl Johannes L (1990) Wittgenstein — eine neubewertung/Wittgenstein — towards a re-evaluation: Akten des 14. internationalen Wittgenstein-symposiums feier des 100. geburtstages 13. bis 20. august 1989 kirchberg am wechsel (Österreich) / proceedings of the 14th international Wittgenstein-symposium centenary celebration 13th to 20th au. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 176-184

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-30086-2_16

Full citation:

Soulez Antonia (1990) „Necessity and contingency in Wittgenstein's thought“, In: R. Haller & J.L. Brandl (eds.), Wittgenstein — eine neubewertung/Wittgenstein — towards a re-evaluation, Dordrecht, Springer, 176–184.